Networks Performance and Contractual Design: Empirical Evidence from Franchising by Chaudey, Magali & Fadairo, Muriel
Networks Performance and Contractual Design:
Empirical Evidence from Franchising
Magali Chaudey, Muriel Fadairo
To cite this version:
Magali Chaudey, Muriel Fadairo. Networks Performance and Contractual Design: Empirical
Evidence from Franchising. 2006. <ujm-00070949>
HAL Id: ujm-00070949
https://hal-ujm.archives-ouvertes.fr/ujm-00070949
Submitted on 22 May 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1
 
 
Networks Performance and Contractual Design 
Empirical Evidence from Franchising 
 
Magali Chaudey*, Muriel Fadairo 
CREUSET, Université Jean Monnet de Saint-Etienne,6 rue Basse-des-Rives, 42023 Saint-Etienne, cedex 2, France 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This article deals with the links between networks performance and the design of vertical contracts. It 
provides evidence broadly consistent with the hypothesis that within franchising systems, constraining 
contracts for the retailers favor a better performance at the network level. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Explaining business performance is one main issue of Industrial Organization. In this way, most 
investigations have focused on market structures. This paper is in the line of studies aiming at evaluating the 
influence of organizational forms on performance (in franchising: Krueger, 1991; Arrunada and Vazquez, 
2003.) However, contrary to the preceding papers, our analysis level is not the production unit but the 
network. 
More precisely, this article deals with the contractual design of relationships between producers and 
distributors. It provides evidence on the links between the features of vertical contracts organizing the 
distribution networks and the performance of these networks. The analytical framework is based on the 
results of the agency theory, which is useful to understand the structure of contracts (section 2). The 
empirical investigation is led on French franchising networks (sections 3 and 4). Concluding comments are 
set forth in section 5. 
 
2. Analytical framework 
 
The agency theory is a relevant framework to analyze the contractual organization of vertical 
relationships (Mathewson and Winter, 1984;  Rey and Tirole, 1986). In this field, vertical restraints1 are 
justified by various coordination problems2. Within a distribution network, one main concern for the 
upstream unit defining the contract is the retailers’ potential opportunism. These theoretical results find 
evidence in the econometrics of franchising (Brickley, 1999; Arrunada and al., 2001). 
On this basis, we assume that constraining contracts for the downstream units reduce vertical 
coordination problems. This involves a better functioning of the network, hence the following testable 
prediction: constraining vertical contracts favor the performance of the network. 
                                                 
1 Vertical restraints are contractual provisions imposed by a producer to constraint the action of one or several retailers. 
2 Moral hazard, horizontal and vertical externalities. 
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3. Data and methodology  
 
The data were collected in the 2003 yearbook of the French Federation of Franchise. Our sample consists 
of the 104 networks established on the French territory and members of the Federation. 
 
3.1. The construction of an incentive global index  
 
Six key provisions in vertical contracts are used to define the degree of constraint (table 1). We 
consider that contracts are more constraining when the royalty rate, advertising fee, amount of entry duties, 
initial investment and personal contribution (own funds excluding loans) required by the franchisor are high, 
and when contracts are of long duration. To homogenize treatments, we construct classes for the DURATION, 
ENTRY, INVESTMENT and CONTRIBUTION variables3. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Table 2 highlights some strong positive correlations, and conversely completely independent 
provisions. More precisely, contracts with no royalties usually enclose no advertising fee, a low entry duty, 
and are of short duration. We use a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to construct an incentive global 
index summarizing the six provisions. This index divides the contracts into two groups: less constraining 
versus highly constraining (see appendix). 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
                                                 
3 Using Ward’s method on squares of the Euclidean distances  (Ward, 1963) 
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3.2. The use of the  Heckman method 
 
Many factors influence both the performance and the organizational choices. For this reason, 
management decisions are usually endogenous to their expected performance outcomes (Hamilton and 
Nickerson, 2003). This is why endogeneity and bias selection appear in the regression equation for 
performance. 
The two-step Heckman method (Heckman, 1979) handles this problem. It consists first in estimating a 
probit selection equation for the strategic choice (here the degree of contractual constraint). This stage is 
used to calculate the non-selection hazard (inverse of Mills’ ratio). In a second step, the regression equation 
for performance estimates an additional parameter representing the non-selection hazard. The significance – 
or not – of the inverse of Mills’ ratio highlights the importance of the corrected selection bias. 
 
 
3.3. Endogenous and explanatory variables 
 
Tables 3 and 4 provide summary statistics for endogenous and explanatory variables. We retain the 
turnover of the network balanced by the size of this network as the performance indicator. 
 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
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4. Econometric model and estimations 
 
The probit selection equation (1) is used to calculate the inverse of Mills’ ratio. 
 
Prob (CONTRACT
i
 
 = 1 /X
 i 
) = c +   
 
α  
 
OWNERSHIP
i 
+ ∑
=
6
1m
 
 
β m INDUSTRY m i + 
 
 εi 
 
(1) 
i = 1, …,104 
 
CONTRACT is 0 when the contractual design is less constraining and 1 when it is highly constraining. 
This equation needs at least one explanatory variable that affects the organizational choice (CONTRACT) but 
not directly the network performance. We choose the variable OWNERSHIP. It is indeed relevant to assume 
that the degree of constraint for the retailers in vertical contracts depends on the type of ownership in the 
network. This means a coherence in the upstream firm’s organizational choices. In order to control sectorial 
effects, we also use a set of industry variables. 
 
The performance equation (2) is augmented with the inverse of Mills’ ratio in order to compensate for 
sample bias. 
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   > 0  ≠0 ≠0  ≠0  i = 1, …,104
with  
α = parameter for the core explanatory variable 
β = parameter for the industry indicators 
γ = parameters for the other control variables  
The symbols below the parameters indicate the predicted sign 
λ = inverse of Mills’ ratio 
ε = term of error 
i = network 
m = industries 
Estimates for INDUSTRY take the food sector as reference. 
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 The estimates for (2) show that lambda is not significant5, which means that there is no noteworthy 
selection bias. For this reason, we suppress the inverse of Mill’s ratio in the final regression. In addition, the 
step-by-step downward selection leads us to hold the DENSITY variable back the regression. The final OLS 
results are given in table 5. 
  
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The empirical results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that there is a link between networks 
performances and the type of vertical relationships. The influence of the contractual design corresponds to 
the predicted sign: constraining contracts improve performance (by 0.4 M€ on average for a network 
characteristic retailer). In addition, the estimations highlight the significant influence of the sector and the 
age of the network on its performance (one additional year increases the mean performance by 0.031 M€ for 
a network characteristic retailer).  
                                                 
5 Results available upon request. 
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Table 1. Contractual provisions used to construct the incentive global index 
 
Designation Definition (number of networks) Mean St-error Min Max 
 
ROYALTIES 
Royalties 
0:  no  (18) 
1: yes  (86) 
 
0.83 
 
0.38 
 
0 
 
1 
 
PUBLICITY 
 
Advertising fee 
0:  no  (41) 
1: yes  (63) 
 
0.61 
 
0.49 
 
0 
 
1 
 
DURATION 
 
Contract duration 
0: ≤ 5 years  (54) 
1: > 5 years  (50) 
 
6.76 
 
 
2.81 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
ENTRY 
Entry duties 
0 ≤15000 €  (56) 
1 >15000 €  (48) 
 
14. 881 
 
 
 
12. 666 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
69  
 
INVESTMENT 
 
Initial investment of the retailer 
0: < 100 K €  (28) 
1: 100 - 200 K €  (35) 
2: > 200 K €  (41) 
 
205.49 
 
 
 
201.57 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
900 
 
 
CONTRIBUTION 
 
Personal capital contribution 
0: < 50 K €  (29) 
1: 50 - 100 K €  (40) 
2: > 100 K €  (35) 
 
77.41 
 
 
 
53.14 
 
 
15 
 
 
300 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Independence Khi-2 for contractual provisions  
 
 ROYALTIES PUBLICITY DURATION ENTRY INVESTMENT 
PUBLICITY 9,81+++     
DURATION 11,92+++ 0,47    
ENTRY 10,76+++ 7,77+++ 22,03+++   
INVESTMENT 1,51 2,61 13,07+++ 18,00+++  
CONTRIBUTION 2,85 0,13 17,88+++ 14,67+++ 25,14+++ 
 
+ Significant at the 10% level + + Significant at the 5% level + + + Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 3. Quantitative variables 
 
Designation Definition Mean St. error Min Max 
PERFORMANCE Turnover per network (in M€) / size of the 
network 
0.91 1.53 0 14.22
OWNERSHIP Number of owned units in the network / 
size of the network 
0.31 0.3 0 0.93 
 
DENSITY 
Number of potential  consumers per outlet 
(thousands of people) 
 
70.39 
 
74.34 
 
1 
 
500 
 
SIZE 
 
Size of the network = 
Number of franchisees per network 
 
160.05 
 
174.12 
 
5 
 
980 
 
AGE 
 
Age of the network (number of years) 
 
19.75 
 
10.45 
 
2 
 
53 
 
 
 
Table 4. Dummy variables 
 
Designation Definition (number of networks) 
 
CONTRACT 
Dummy variable defining the type of 
contract 
0: inciting (55) 
1: constraining (49) 
 
 
INDUSTRY 
Dichotomous variables related to the 
belonging of the network in the sector.  
 
Auto services (11) 
Home equipment (20) 
Services for individuals (13) 
Textiles-Clothing (18) 
Hotel-Restaurant (20) 
Food (13) 
Leisure (9) 
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Table 5. OLS estimates 
Variable Coefficients
 
Standard 
error 
Constant - 0.49 0.47 
Contract 0.40+++ 0.14 
Auto services 0.44++ 0.19 
Home equipment  0.53+++ 0.19 
Services for 
individuals 
0.33++ 0.16 
Textiles-Clothing 0.35++ 0.17 
Hotel-Restaurant 1.54++ 0.59 
Leisure 0.47++ 0.21 
Age 0.31 E-01+ 0.18 E-01 
Results corrected for heteroskedasticity 
Fisher probability = 0. 00117 
Number of observations: 104 
 
+ Significant at the 10% level + + Significant at the 5% level + + + Significant at the 1% level 
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Appendix: Multiple correspondence analysis 
 
 
Table 6.Burt table for the six provisions 
 
  ROYALTIES PUBLICITY DURATION ENTRY INVESTMENT CONTRIBUTION 
  0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 2 
0 18 0             
ROYALTIES 1 0 86             
0 13 28 41 0           
PUBLICITY 1 5 58 0 63           
0 16 38 23 31 54 0         
DURATION 1 2 48 18 32 0 50         
0 15 39 27 27 40 14 54 0       
ENTRY 1 3 47 14 36 14 36 0 50       
0 5 23 8 20 21 7 21 7 28 0 0    
1 8 27 17 18 20 15 22 13 0 35 0    INVESTMENT 
2 5 36 16 25 13 28 11 30 0 0 41    
0 6 23 12 17 19 10 22 7 17 8 4 29 0 0 
1 9 31 16 24 27 13 22 18 9 14 17 0 40 0 CONTRIBUTION 
2 3 32 13 22 8 27 10 25 2 13 20 0 0 35 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Eigenvalues of the correspondence factor analysis from the Burt table  
 
Total Inertia=,30436 Chi²=1139,5 df=169 p=0,0000 
Dimensions Singular 
values 
Eigenvalues Perc. of Inertia Cumulative perc. 
1 0,3969 0,1576 51,77 51,77 
2 0,2360 0,0557 18,30 70,07 
3 0,1809 0,0327 10,75 80,82 
4 0,1565 0,0245 8,05 88,87 
5 0,1145 0,0131 4,31 93,18 
6 0,0938 0,0088 2,89 96,07 
7 0,0788 0,0062 2,04 98,11 
8 0,0758 0,0057 1,89 100,00 
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Table 8. First factorial design (representation of the contracts) 
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Dimension 1 represents all the provisions from the less constraining on the left to the most constraining 
on the right. This dimension enables to “quantify” the contract of each network of the sample according to its 
level of constraint. It is then possible to create two groups. 
 
 
